(TTT) required to attain a given fraction of RF and time to next failure (TTNF) are shown to be useful reliability measures & predictions for:
providing assurance that the software has achieved safety goals; ~ ratilonalizing how long to test a piece of software; analyzing the risk of not achieving RF & TTNF goals. Having predictions of the extent that the software is not fault free (RF) and whether it is likely to survive a mission (TTNF) provide criteria for assessing the risk of deploying the software. Furthermore, 'fraction of RF' can be used as both an operational-quality goal in predicting TTT requirements and, conversely, as an indicator of operational-quality as a function of TTT expended.
Software reliability models provide one of several tools that software managers of the Shuttle flight software are using to assure that tlhe software meets required safety goals. Other tools are inspections, software reviews, testing, change control boards, and perhaps most important -experience & judgement.
1. INTRODUCTION' Two categories of software reliability measurements (observed failure data used for model parameter estimation) and predictions (forecasts of future reliability using the parameterized mlodel) are used together to assist in assuring the safety of the software in safetycritical systems like the Shuttle flight software. The two categories are: -'Acronyms, nomenclature, and notation are given at the end of the Introduction.
1. measurements & predictions that are associated with residual software faults and failures; 2 . measurements & predictions that are associated with the ability of the software to survive a mission without experiencing a serious failure.
In category #I are: RF, maximum failures, fraction of RF, and TTT required to attain a given number or fraction of RF. In category #2 are: TTNF, and TTT required to attain a given TTNF, In addition, the risk associated with not attaining the required RF and TTNF is defined. A quantity from the 'fraction of RF' (operational quality) is derived.
The benefits of predicting these quantities are that they provide:
assurance that the software has achieved safety goals, a means of rationalizing how long to test a piece of software Having predictions of the extent that the software is not fault free (RF) and its ability to survive a mission (TTNF) are meaningful for assessing the risk of deploying safety-critical software. In addition, with this type of information, a software manager can determine whether more testing is warranted or whether the software is sufficiently tested to allow its release or unrestricted use. These predictions, in combination with other methods of assurance, such as inspections, defect prevention, project control boards, process assessment, and fault tracking, provide a quantitative basis for achieving safety & reliability goals if a serious software failure occurs during a mission. Risk criterion metrics are developed to quantify the degree of risk associated with such an occurrence. Lockheed-Martin, the primary contractor on the Shuttle flight software project, is experimenting with a promising algorithm which involves the use of SSRM to compute a parameter: fraction of RF as a function of the archived failure history during test & operation [lo] . The prediction methodology in this paper uses this parameter and other reliability quantities to provide bounds on TTT, RF, operational quality, and TTNF, that are necessary to meet Shuttle safety requirements. This paper shows that there is a pronounced asymptotic characteristic to the TTT and to operational quality curves that indicate the possibility of big gains in reliability as testing continues; eventually the gains become marginal as testing continues. This prediction methodology is feasible for the Shuttle and other safety-critical systems.
This paper covers only the safety of the software in a safetycritical system. The hardware & human-operator components of such systems are not explicitly modeled nor are the hardware-& operator-induced software failures. However, in practice, these hardware-software interface and human operator-software interface failures can be very difficult to identify as such; these failures might be recorded as software failures. The concern here is with reducing the risk of all failures attributed to software. Thus, safety refers to software-safety and not to system-safety .
RF has been discussed in general as a type of software reliability prediction [ 131. Various stopping rules for testing have been proposed, based on costs of testing and releasing software [4, 5 , 8, 171, failure intensity [12] , and testability [18] . Our approach is novel because it integrates software-safety criteria, risk analysis, reliability prediction, and a stopping rule for testing. For a system like the Shuttle where human lives are at risk, economic or time-to-market criteria can not be used to determine when to deploy the software. Although failure intensity has proven useful for allocating test effort and for determining when to stop testing in commercial systems [12] , this criterion is not directly related to software safety. In a safetycritical system, the 'prediction of RF' and 'identification of the faults which cause them' is more relevant to ensuring safety than the trend of failure intensity over time. The latent faults must be found and then removed through additional testing, inspection, or other means, if mission safety is not to be jeopardized. Furthermore, as shown, RF along with TTNF can be used as risk criteria. It is not clear how failure intensity could be a meaningful safety criterion.
Because testability attempts to quantify the failure probability if the code is faulty [ 181, this criterion has a relationship with reliability if we know that the code is faulty. However in the Shuttle and other safety-critical software, the purpose is to predict whether the code is faulty. For safety-critical software, reliability measurements & predictions must be used to assess whether safety & mission goals are likely to be achieved.
Two criteria for software safety are defined, and then applied to risk analysis of safety-critical software, using the Shuttle flight software as an example. Next, definitions and brief derivations are provided for a variety of prediction equations that are used in reliability prediction and risk analysis; included is the relationship between TTNF and 'reduction in RF'. This is followed by an explanation of the principal of 'optimal selection of failure data' that involves selecting only the most relevant set of failure data for reliability prediction, with the result of producing more accurate predictions than would be the case if the entire set of data were used. Then it is shown how the prediction equations can be used to integrate testing with reliability & quality. An example shows how the risk analysis and reliability predictions can be used to decide whether the software is safe to deploy. Validation results are shown for a variety of predictions. 
Acronyms

Definitions
Failure: The inability of a system or system-component to perform a required function within specified limits [ 11.
Fault: A defect in the code that can be the cause of one or more failures [ 11. Interval: An integer time unit t of constant length defined by t-1 < t < t + l , t > 0; failures are counted in intervals (eg, one failure occurred in interval 4) [l, 71.
Number of Intervals: The number of contiguous integer time units t of constant length represented by a positive real number (eg, the predicted TTNF is 3.87 intervals).
01: A software system comprised of modules, and configured from a set of builds to meet Shuttle mission functional requirements. Time: Continuous CPU execution time over an interval range. If 'safety goal' is defined as the reduction of failures that would cause loss of life, loss of mission, or abort of mission, to an acceptable level of risk [ 111, then for software to be ready to deploy, after having been tested for tr, the following 2 criteria must be satisfied:
For systems that are tested & operated continuously like the Shuttle, the t,, TF(tt), tm are measured in execution time. As with any methodology for assuring software safety, we cannot guarantee safety. Rather, with these criteria, we seek to reduce the risk of 'deploying the software' to an acceptable level.
RF. Criterion #1
Using assumption #1 (as for the Shuttle), criterion #1 specifies that the residual failures & faults must be reduced to a level where the risk of operating the software is acceptable.
As a practical matter, I suggest r, = 1. That is, the goal is to reduce the s-expected RF to less than one before deploying the software. The reason for this choice is that one or more RF is an unacceptable risk for safety-critical systems. This is the threshold used by the Shuttle software managers. One way to specify r, is by failure severity level (eg, severity level 1 for life threatening failures). Another way, which imposes a more demanding safety requirement, is to specify that r, represents all severity levels. For example, r (t,) < 1 would mean that r ( t r ) must be less than one failure, independent of severity level.
If we predict r(t,) 2 r,, we would continue to test for a TTT t; > t, that is predicted to achieve r ( t ; ) < r,, using assumption #2 that we will experience more failures and correct more faults so that the RF will be reduced by r(t,) -r ( t;) . If the developer does not have the resources to satisfy criterion #1 or is unable to satisfy criterion #I through additional testing, the risk of deploying the software prematurely should be assessed (see section 2.2). The Dijkstra dictum states that we can not demonstrate the absence of faults [6] ; however we can reduce the 'risk of failures occurring' to an acceptable level, as represented by r,, as shown in figure 1. Case A of figure 1 predicts r(t,) < r, and the mission begins at tr In both cases criterion #2 must also be satisfied for the mission to begin.
TTNF. Criterion #2
Criterion #2 specifies that the software must survive for a time greater than the mission duration. If we predict TF(tt) 5 t,, then we continue to test for t;' > tt that is predicted to achieve TF(tr) > t,, using assumption #2 that we will experience more failures and correct more faults so that the TTNF will be increased by TF(tr) -TF(tt). Again, if it is infeasible for the developer to satisfy criterion #2 because of lack of resources or failure to achieve test objectives, the risk of deploying the software prematurely should be assessed (see section 3). Figure 2 shows this scenario. Case A of figure 2 predicts T F ( t f ) > t, and the mission begins at tr Case B of figure 2 predicts TF(t,) I t, and postpones the mission until we test for t;' and predict TF(~;') > t,. In both cases, criterion #1 must also be satisfied for the mission to begin. If neither criterion #1 nor #2 is satisfied, test for max (t;, t r ) . < 0 * r ( t t ) < r, a SAFE (below the X-axis: r(t,) < safe value). Figure 4 is for 01-D. In this example at tf = 57, the risk transitions from the UNSAFE region to the SAFE region.
Start
3.2 TTNF, Criterion #2 Figure 5 is for 01-C. In this example at all values of t,, the RCM is in the SAFE region.
APPROACH TO PREDICTION
To support the safety goal and to assess the risk of deploying the software, various reliability & quality predictions are made. These predictions are used for tradeoff analysis between reliability and TTT. Thus, this approach is to use a software reliability model to predict: maximum failures, RF, and operational quality (as defined TTNF (beyond the last observed failure); TTT necessary to achieve required levels of RF (fault) with increases in testing. Figure 4 . RCM for RF, OLD Figure 5 plots (4) 
Total Test Time (30 Day lnte
. PREDICTION EQUATIONS
The prediction equations in this section:
are all for mean values; are based on the SSRM, one of the 4 models recommended in the AIAA Recommended Practice for Software Reliability U]; use assumptions #1 -#5 in the Introduction; are derived in section 6; are applied to analyze the reliability of the Shuttle flight software.
+
Because the flight software is run continuously, around the clock, in simulation, test, or flight, time refers to continuous execution time, and TTT refers to execution time for testing. Failure-count intervals are 30 days of continuous execution time. This interval is long because the Shuttle software is tested for several years; a 30-day interval length is convenient for recording failures for software that is tested this long. Figure 6 shows these 'failure-count interval relationships' and t,. Failures are counted against 01. Data from four Shuttle 01, designated 01-A, 01-B, 01-C, 01-D, are used in this analysis.
Cumulative Failures
Using maximum likelihood estimates for 01 & 0, with s as the starting interval for using observed failure data, 
Failures in an Interval Range
Let t=r2; subtract X,, = Xs-l+Xs,il. Then from (6),
Maximum Failures
Let t-co in (6).
RF
To obtain r ( t ) , subtract X, = Xs-+ Xs,r from (8):
The r ( t ) can be expressed as a function of tr by substituting (5) into (9) , and setting t tt: r(t,) = y.exp[-P. (t,-s+ l ) ) ] .
Fraction of RF
Divide (9) by (8):
Operational Quality
Operational quality of software is the degree to which software is free of remaining faults (failures), using assumption #l.
TTT to Achieve Specified RF
TF(t) = p-'.log(y/*13) -( t -s -t l ) ,
for \k13 > 0, t = current interval.
Discussion
Consider (5) -(1 l), (14) to be predictors of reliability that are related to safety; (13) represents the predicted TTT required to achieve stated safety goals. If a quality requirement is stated in terms of 'fraction of RF', the definition of Q as Operational Quality (12), is consistent with the IEEE definition of quality: the degree to which a system, component, or process meets specified requirements [9] . For example, let a reliability specification require that software is to have no more than 5 % RF ( p = 0.05, Q = 0.95) after testing for tt intervals; then a predicted Q = 0.90 indicates the degree to which the software meets specified requirements.
Relating Time to Next N Failures and RF Predictions
The risk analysis and prediction equations for RF & TTNF are shown separately. It is useful to combine them in one equation so that we can predict the effect on one quantity for a given change in the other. In particular we want to predict, at time t , the TF( Ar,t) , that would be achieved if RF were reduced by
Ar. Use assumption #1 ( N = A r ) .
When N = l , we have the familiar TTNF. When N > 1, TF(Ar,t) is interpreted as cumulative execution time for the N failures to occur. Conversely, we want to predict, at time t , the Ar( TF,t) that would be achieved if the software were executed for a time TF. This relationship is derived using (10) and setting:
The r ( t,) is obtained from (10) 5.8 TTNF tl = t , (13) and solving for At = TF(Ar,t): (7); set tl = t; define Fi =
F ( t , t + T F ) ; solve for T F ( t ) :
T'(Ar,t) = (-I/@) *lOg(l-*IJ, shows that: because the product & process change over the life of the software, old failure data (s= 1) are not as representative of the current state of the product & process as the more recent failure data (s> 1) [14] . The s* used in the risk analysis and prediction examples are shown in tables 1-4.
SMERFS [7]
is used for all predictions except tr, TF ( Ar, t ) , and Ar ( TF, t ) , which are not implemented in SME,RFS.
MSE Criterion for RF
Although we can never know whether additional failures mighit occur, nevertheless we can form the difference between two 'equations for r ( t ) : (9) which is a function of 'predicted Use (8) to predict F ( CO) = 11.76 for Shuttle 01-A. Using given values of p and (1 l), and setting t = t,, predict r ( t,) for each value of p . The values of r(t,) are the predictions of RF after the 01 has been executed for tt. Then use the values of r (t,) and (13) (17) 7.2 Predicting Operational Quality
IMSE Criterion for TTNF
From [14] :
Eq (12) is a useful measure of the operational quality of software because it measures the degree to which faults have been removed from the software (using assumption #1), relative to predicted maximum failures. This is operational quality (based 5 on software execution) to distinguish it from static quality (eg, based on software complexity).
[Jsing given values of p , and (1 1) & (12), and setting t in (13) 1 failure occurred at t = 4, 14, 18, 2 failures occurred at t = 8, 10.
All failures were Severity Level #3. The way to read the graph is:
Take a given failure, eg, Failure 1; it occurs at t=4. Therefore, at t = 1 the TTNF is 3 = 4 -1. At t = 2 the TTNF is 2 = 4 -2. At t=4, Failure 1 occurs, so the TTNF is 4 = 8 -4, which now refers to 'Failure 2'; etc. Using (14) , predict the TTNF T'( 18) to be 4 (3.87 rounded) on the dashed curve. Figure 10 shows this for OI-A, where, eg, with Ar= 1, we predict TF( I, 18) = 3.87 (a 'reduction in RF' of 1 corresponds to achieving a TTNF of 3.87 intervals from the current interval 18). Conversely, by using (16), we predict Ar( T',t) as a function of TP Figure 11 shows this for OI-A, where, eg, with TF=3.87, we predict Ar(3.87,18) = 1 (executing OI-A for a TTNF of 3.87 intervals from the current interval 18 corresponds to achieving a 'reduction in RF' of 1). Section 8 elaborates further on these graphs.
Execution Time (30 Day Intervals)
. MAKING SAFETY-DECISIONS
To decide about tz, apply the safety criteria and risk assessment approach. Table 1 illustrates the process. For tt= 18 (when the last failure occurred on OI-A), r,= 1, and t,,, = 8 days (0.267 intervals), then we show RF, RCM for RF, TTNF, RCM for TTNF, and operational quality. These results indicate that safety criterion #2 is satisfied but not criterion #1 (UNSAFE with respect to RF); also operational quality is low. Figure 10 and Using the converse of the relationship in figure 10 , provides another perspective, as shown in figure 11 , where if we continue to test for an additional TF=34 intervals, starting at interval 18, the predicted 'reduction in RF' that would be achieved is 4.16, or r(52) = 0.60. r(52)i = 0.60 < rc = 1.
In figure 10 and table 1, the 'fraction of RF': Figure 12 shows the Launch Decision, relevant to the Shuttle, (or, generically, the Deployment Decision), where RF are plotted against TTT for 01-A. With these results, the software manager can decide whether to deploy the software, depending on factors such as predicted RF as shown in figure 12 , along with other factors such as the 'trend in reported faults over time', and 'inspection results'. If testing were to continue until tt =52, the predictions in figure 12 and table 1 would be obtained. These results show that criterion #1 is now satisfied (SAFE) and 'operational quality' is high. Figure 12 shows that at this value of tt, further increases in tt would not result in an important increase in reliability & safety. At t,=52 it is not feasible to predict T F ( 5 2 ) because the 'predicted RF' < 1.
9. SUMMARY OF PREDICTIONS AND VALIDATION4 t t ( r = 3 ) = 35.47, Actual=23.70. Despite the fact that SSRM uses optimal selection of failure data, and thus less than the full set of data, there must be a minimum number of failures to start the parameter estimation process, understanding that the model will then selects*. Thus, given the sparsity of the data, all failures in table 5 were used in parameter estimation, regardless of their severity. Furthermore, as described earlier, a more conservative risk assessment is produced if all categories of failures are included in the analysis. 
Predictions
